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Abstract—Use-after-free vulnerabilities have plagued software
written in low-level languages, such as C and C++, becoming
one of the most frequent classes of exploited software bugs.
Attackers identify code paths where data is manually freed by
the programmer, but later incorrectly reused, and take advantage
by reallocating the data to themselves. They then alter the data
behind the program’s back, using the erroneous reuse to gain
control of the application and, potentially, the system. While a
variety of techniques have been developed to deal with these
vulnerabilities, they often have unacceptably high performance
or memory overheads, especially in the worst case.
We have designed MarkUs, a memory allocator that prevents
this form of attack at low overhead, sufficient for deployment
in real software, even under allocation- and memory-intensive
scenarios. We prevent use-after-free attacks by quarantining data
freed by the programmer and forbidding its reallocation until
we are sure that there are no dangling pointers targeting it. To
identify these we traverse live-objects accessible from registers
and memory, marking those we encounter, to check whether
quarantined data is accessible from any currently allocated
location. Unlike garbage collection, which is unsafe in C and
C++, MarkUs ensures safety by only freeing data that is both
quarantined by the programmer and has no identifiable dan-
gling pointers. The information provided by the programmer’s
allocations and frees further allows us to optimise the process
by freeing physical addresses early for large objects, specialising
analysis for small objects, and only performing marking when
sufficient data is in quarantine. Using MarkUs, we reduce the
overheads of temporal safety in low-level languages to 1.1× on
average for SPEC CPU2006, with a maximum slowdown of only
2×, vastly improving upon the state-of-the-art.
I. INTRODUCTION
The lack of temporal safety in low-level languages, such as
C and C++, has become a critical cause of insecurity in
modern systems. Large, security-critical applications, such as
web browsers [1], [2] and operating system kernels [3], are
increasingly plagued with use-after-free vulnerabilities. Here,
data is mistakenly freed by a process, reallocated, and altered
by an attacker with control of data input, then incorrectly
reused by the process. These allow the attacker to alter control
flow, and potentially gain kernel-level access.
A variety of techniques have been proposed to mitigate
use-after-free vulnerabilities in C and C++. For example,
all pointer locations can be logged and then nullified when
their data is freed [1], [4], [5], objects allocated with their
own page-table entries [6], [7], or probabilistic reuse delays
employed [8]–[10]. However, these tend to exhibit both high
average- and worst-case overheads in terms of performance
and memory utilisation, or have limited coverage.
We take a different approach with MarkUs, by storing
programmer-freed object locations in quarantine until we can
demonstrate that no dangling pointers exist to them. We do
this by performing a live-object traversal of accessible memory
regions, similar to but much more efficient than the behaviour
of a garbage collector [11], to mark accessible heap objects.
Since only objects freed by the programmer can be reallocated,
language safety is maintained, and since objects with dangling
pointers cannot be reallocated, programmer frees do not need
to be relied on for security. This allows use-after-free attack
prevention at low overhead even in complex cases, while
maintaining compatibility with real-world applications.
We can use the information provided by the programmer’s
untrusted manual frees to reduce the cost of the live-object
traversal. We can reallocate the physical pages used by large
objects as soon as they are freed, using the unmapped virtual
addresses as protection, to reduce the frequency of marking
procedures without increasing memory utilisation. In addition,
because we know the amount of memory we can potentially
reclaim from a marking process, we can eliminate needless
memory traversals, reduce marking frequency by only attempt-
ing to reclaim objects when enough can be freed, and, further,
trade off memory usage for performance.
MarkUs gives performance overhead and memory usage that
is low enough for real-world use, for all applications written
in low-level languages. For example, for SPEC CPU2006, we
achieve an average slowdown of just 1.1× (2× worst case),
with average memory overhead of 1.15× (2× worse case),
both of which are lower than any other competing technique.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• The realisation that free() can be treated as a hint for
reallocating memory but the actual reallocation can be
decoupled for security.
• Use of a marking procedure to verify programmer deal-
locations and permit reallocation.
• Use of a quarantine list to store programmer-freed data
until it has been verified as safe to reallocate.
• Page-table optimisations to immediately free physical
address space for large deallocations, while still ensuring
high performance for small deallocations.
• Optimisations using knowledge of the volume of data
freed, to vastly reduce marking-procedure overheads, and
trade off memory and performance overhead.
• Evaluation on a variety of real-world and allocation-
intensive workloads, including multithreaded setups and
comparison against state-of-the-art techniques.
1 Object x = new Object();
2 delete(x);
3 ...
4 // x’s vtable replaced by the attacker, who is
5 // reallocated x’s address space with y.
6 Object y = new Object(user_input);
7 ...
8 // Control diverted to attacker’s pointer, in
9 // the place of the original delete function.
10 delete(x);
Fig. 1: An example use-after-free attack, in C++. The attacker
is allocated data that is still pointed to by x, and can manipulate
the data to redirect the old pointer to a chosen function rather
than the original object’s delete call.
(a) In an object’s first deletion, the call to delete is correctly looked
up in the vtable of the object.
(b) Once the programmer has deleted the object, the space it contains
is free to be reallocated. However, in this case the pointer still points
to the deleted object, and so can still be derefenced and used.
(c) As the memory object has been freed, this allows the attacker to
reallocate it and store their own data in the same location, overwriting
the vtable with their own data. A subsequent, incorrect, call to delete,
which often exists due to programmer bugs, via the now-dangling
pointer will then be redirected to the attacker’s choice of code,
allowing them to hijack the application.
Fig. 2: The example use-after-free attack shown in figure 1,
in terms of allocated data.
II. BACKGROUND
Here we describe use-after-free attacks, and solutions in
higher-level languages, before presenting our threat model.
A. Use-After-Free Attacks
In a use-after-free attack [12], an object is freed prematurely
before being incorrectly reused via a dangling pointer. By
this point an attacker may have changed its contents to
point to their own data, by forcing the allocator to reallocate
to the attacker the region targeted by the dangling pointer.
Example code is given in figure 1, and the associated memory
behavior is shown in figure 2. This is a particularly damaging
vulnerability due to its common occurrence in large codebases,
and high level of exploitability. For example, as of 2013 it was
the most widespread memory vulnerability in Chromium [1].
Operating-system kernels and browsers are particularly af-
fected by use-after-free attacks [2], [3], as high-value targets
written in manually memory-managed languages.
This is a memory-safety violation: in C/C++, the use of
freed memory, or memory accessed outside the bounds of data
structures, is considered undefined behavior. Specifically, use-
after-free attacks come under the category of temporal-safety
violations, where something is accessed after a point where
it is no longer allowed. This contrasts with spatial violations,
such as buffer overflows [13].
An attacker can utilise control over the data stored in
a still-accessible object in various ways. Particularly useful
methods include double-delete attacks, where a C++-style
delete virtual function pointer is overwritten by an attacker
before an incorrect second free, or, more generally, a function
pointer is overwritten in an object before it is incorrectly called
after a free. This allows attackers to divert the program to their
own choice of code within a process’s address space.
B. Garbage Collection
Garbage collection [14] solves the problem for high-level
languages (at least excluding their own runtimes, typically
written in lower-level languages), in that data is only freed
when no pointers to it are available. This means dangling
pointers do not exist, and so use-after-free attacks cannot
occur. Still, often a performance hit is observed, and as such
safe techniques for manual deallocation have been added even
in languages where garbage collection is safe [15].
In C and C++ the picture is somewhat more complex. In
most runtimes on most architectures we cannot distinguish
pointers from other data, and indeed the two can be converted
between each other. This means we are limited to conservative
garbage collection [11], where we must assume all data may
be a pointer, creating the chance of accidental references.
This is reasonable for small objects, as the chance of a given
object being coincidentally pointed to is vanishingly small,
and the cost of each failed free is very low. However, larger
objects cause issues, as the probability of a false mark and the
memory-usage cost of this both increase. Some conservative
garbage collectors [16] offer the ability to manually free
objects to prevent such leaks, in addition to automatically
attempting to clear objects by garbage collection, but this
opens up the potential for use-after-free attacks.
Another problem for garbage collection in C and C++ is that
it is not typically safe. Pointers can be hidden with arbitrary
arithmetic, such as in XOR lists, meaning that data that should
be live is incorrectly deleted [17]. Compiler optimisations
can also hide pointers [18], which means that many high-
performance applications do not run correctly in the presence
of a garbage collector.
MarkUs is not a garbage collector, and does not use garbage
collection. Still, the marking procedure of a typical garbage
collector performs the same live-object traversal necessary to
detect dangling pointers to quarantined objects, allowing us
to implement similar code to verify whether the manual frees
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Fig. 3: Memory objects freed by the programmer are placed
on a quarantine list. This is periodically checked by a marking
procedure, where the stack, data, bss, and registers are walked
to find accessible heap pointers, and any data transitively ac-
cessible from those pointers. MarkUs can deallocate unmarked
objects that are already on the quarantine list whereas other,
marked, objects must remain on the quarantine list for security.
In this example, D remains on the quarantine list because
it is accessible transitively through a pointer starting on the
stack. Solid lines show application pointers, dotted lines show
MarkUs pointers to objects on the quarantine list.
of the programmer are yet inaccessible. This means that we
can find dangling pointers while still ensuring that only data
the programmer has actually freed can be deleted, resulting
in correct program behavior even in the presence of hidden
pointers. Further, information from the programmer’s frees
can be used to optimise the process, by unmapping physical
pages early, and only performing a marking procedure when
sufficient manual frees are ready to be vetted.
C. Threat Model
We assume that programs execute in the presence of an at-
tacker able to allocate memory, for example through carefully
constructed inputs, and who can force the program to read
freed data. This attacker wishes to gain further control over
the program, for example by redirecting control-flow.
Like other papers on use-after-free mitigation [1], [7], we
only look at heap use-after-free, rather than stack, as the heap
attack is both the most difficult to protect against and by far
the most commonly exploited [19]. This is because attacks
based on data freed on the stack can be handled with static
checks, such as escape analysis [7].
III. MARKUS
MarkUs is a memory allocator designed to prevent security
violations from use-after-free attacks, intended for production
scenarios where preventing their use is more important than
detecting their existence. It delays the reuse of programmer-
freed memory objects until certain that there are no dangling
pointers that target the freed range. It is designed primarily for
C and C++, but is suitable for any languages that allocate using
malloc and free, or new and delete, which it replaces with
its own implementation. The MarkUs library can be used in
applications either by directly calling the replacment functions
and linking against the library, or by dynamically replacing
these functions at runtime.
Within MarkUs, calls to deallocate or free data are replaced
with a call to add the memory object to an intermediate
structure, the quarantine list, shown in figure 3. Objects are
kept here until known to be safe to reallocate, at which point
they are moved to the allocator’s free lists. To identify this,
we traverse all live objects, marking those we find; those
on the quarantine list that are unmarked at the end do not
have dangling pointers pointing to them. This means that only
programmer-freed data audited by this marking procedure is
actually freed, achieving safety with respect to the original
implementation at the same time as security from use-after-
free attacks. Large allocations can be reused before a marking
procedure, by unmapping virtual pages and allowing the
operating system to reallocate the physical. We can also reduce
overheads by using the information from the programmer’s
manual free calls to control frequency of marking procedures,
and to trade off performance overhead for memory utilisation.
A. Quarantine List
To prevent use-after-free attacks, we must ensure that there are
no pointers to a given freed object before we can allow it to
be reallocated. By manually freeing an object, a programmer
claims it is safe to free and reallocate. MarkUs decouples these
two, allowing the programmer to free the object and claim
it is safe, but delaying reallocation until this is validated. To
achieve this, rather than immediately placing a manually freed
object on a free list, we quarantine it until we can verify the
programmer is correct, placing it instead on a quarantine list.
Only objects on this quarantine list are allowed to be
deleted. This is necessary to conserve safety within C and
C++, and prevent accidental deletion of data pointed to by
hidden pointers as a result of, for example, XOR pointers or
compiler optimisations [17], [18]. This means that, despite our
mark-based technique, MarkUs deliberately does not attempt
to prevent memory-leaks by the programmer. It is purely a
technique to improve the security aspect of an application.
The quarantine list itself is not inherently trusted. Instead,
it is used as a guide to what the programmer believes should
be freeable, for safety rather than security. It is then up to
MarkUs to audit the list to see if it agrees, before an object is
truly freed and made available for new allocations.
B. Identifying Live Objects
Periodically, we search for objects on the quarantine list that
can or cannot be freed, by traversing all live objects and
marking those we encounter, starting with those visible from
registers, the BSS and data segments, and the stack, then
transitively any heap objects pointed to by this set. Such
objects, and their pointers, are recursively walked using a
graph traversal, with any word treated as a pointer if it
appears to point within the heap’s bounds. An example is
shown in figure 3. This is similar to a mark procedure from a
garbage collector, and we use the Boehm-Demers-Weiser [16]
implementation.
Marking an object on the quarantine list is not necessarily
indicative of a bug. This is because of both conservatism, in
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that data values may coincidentally point to objects on the
heap, and the existence of a pointer not necessarily indicating
its future use. This is one reason why MarkUs, and, more
generally, any other runtime technique, cannot detect all use-
after-free occurrences within programs, though it does prevent
their use for security violations. Conversely, an object that is
not on the quarantine list and isn’t marked cannot be freed, to
preserve safety under pointer-hiding [17], [18].
This marking procedure can be performed in parallel [16],
and there is no need to stop execution of the program during
it (see section III-H). Indeed, the constraints here are looser
than a traditional garbage collector, as safety is ensured by
the quarantine list preventing deallocation of any data not
specified by the programmer. This means the guarantees of
the marker need only prevent any race condition in the marker
from causing exploitable security vulnerabilities.
Further, this step need not be performed by a traditional
marker, which transitively follows pointers to find those which
are accessible. While that is necessary in a true garbage collec-
tor to avoid circular references in deallocatable objects, with
manual freeing this could be avoided by zeroing out objects
when they are added to the quarantine list. This means that,
potentially, a sweep of the entire stack, heap, registers, and
BSS segment is sufficient, and more cache-friendly. Though
the performance overheads are potentially higher, we use a
traditional mark in our implementation, to reuse more of the
Boehm-Demers-Weiser garbage collector [16].
C. Quarantine-List Walk
Following a marking procedure, a garbage collector would
sweep the heap looking for free objects. However, for MarkUs
this is not a safe underapproximation of what is truly freeable,
due to hidden pointers, and is unnecessary, as we already have
a list of candidates in the quarantine list. Instead of a sweep,
we walk the quarantine list, and free anything that wasn’t
marked in the previous marking procedure. Anything that is
marked is left on the list, as we cannot guarantee it will not be
reused by the current holder of the pointer. Anything that is
not marked is moved to the relevant free list in the allocator,
based on its size, to be reallocated by malloc or new.
D. Mark Frequency Optimisation
Marking is typically the most expensive part of a garbage
collector, and this is also true of MarkUs. This means, to
reduce overheads, we need to mark as infrequently as possible.
One thing that MarkUs can exploit to do this, that a real
garbage collector cannot, is that it knows how much data it
can possibly free, because it knows the size of its manually-
freed quarantine list. We can therefore trade off expected
memory usage for performance, by only allowing garbage
collection when the size of data on the quarantine list exceeds
a proportion of the total current heap size.
More specifically, we allow marking procedures when
(qlsize−failed frees−usize)∗N > (heap size−unmapped)
where N is a chosen growth bound, which can be controlled
to trade off heap growth compared to an unprotected program
with performance overhead, qlsize (quarantine list size) is the
amount of data currently waiting to be audited (either added
after a previous marking procedure, or from a failed attempt in
a previous round), failed frees is the amount of data that failed
to be deallocated in the previous round, and so is likely to fail
again in the near-term future, and usize (unmapped size) is the
proportion of the quarantine list that is not taking up physical
memory space, as it has been unmapped. Further, heap size is
the total size of the heap allocated to a process, and unmapped
is the proportion of the heap that has been unmapped, and so
does not represent physical memory utilisation.
This does not result in a strict limit on heap growth com-
pared with an unprotected program, and there is no maximum
quarantine size. This is because we may not be able to
free some data due to the presence of dangling pointers or
conservative overestimation of data as pointers. In addition,
while previously failed frees may be successful in the next
round of a marking procedure, as the dangling pointer may
disappear, they are disregarded as part of the trigger condition
for mark culling to prevent constant ineffective marking when
large numbers of failed frees exist. Still, under the assumption
that accessible data on the quarantine list is rare, we can
control overheads based on system parameters.
E. Allocator Details
Because it provides data structures to set mark bits for the
marking procedure, we use the allocator from the Boehm-
Demers-Weiser garbage collector [11]. This splits objects into
two sizes: those larger than a page are allocated as monolithic
objects with their own headers, at page-sized granularities. For
MarkUs, this means the entire object can be unmapped from
the virtual address space once it is freed from quarantine, as no
other objects will share pages with the freed object. However,
for objects smaller than a page, the allocator uses a pool
strategy: a single header is used for an entire page of objects,
which are all the same size and initialised simultaneously, to
reduce metadata and allocation overheads. Mark bits are stored
in these headers rather than the objects themselves.
Objects are initialised to zero upon allocation, to reduce the
probability of old false pointers appearing when these objects
are later walked by the marking procedure. These pointers
would reduce the proportion of objects we could securely
free. Zeroing also has the helpful side-effect of mitigating
information leakage via heap initialisation bugs [20], another
class of temporal safety violations.
Other allocators could use MarkUs’s strategy to eliminate
use-after-free vulnerabilities—the allocator’s implementation
choices typically neither help nor hinder MarkUs, and instead
add orthogonal overheads and performance benefits. However,
since these allocators would then need separate support added
for mark bits, to limit engineering work we only evaluate on
the Boehm-Demers-Weiser allocator with existing support.
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F. Page Unmapping
For large allocations, we can provide a form of use-after-free
detection, as well as prevention, by unmapping pages upon
a user’s deallocation, as long as an object’s allocated region
entirely covers each unmapped page. Subsequent access to an
unmapped page will result in a segmentation fault, correctly
flagging the use of a dangling pointer.
There are also performance and memory-consumption bene-
fits to this approach. Because we unmap these physical pages,
they can be reused in a subsequent mmap call for another
allocation without any need for a marking procedure. As
virtual addresses are typically an ample resource, particularly
on 64-bit architectures, this can significantly cut down the per-
formance overhead of MarkUs in the face of large allocations,
as marking frequency for a given memory overhead can be
significantly reduced. For large objects, this can potentially
be the only practical way of recovering physical memory. As
a single allocation grows in size, in a conservative marker
the likelihood of unrelated data coincidentally pointing to an
address within that allocation’s range increases. This means
a marking procedure may be unable to free and reallocate
such an allocation. For a true garbage collector, this can cause
memory leaks without allowing unsafe manual deallocation,
but for MarkUs, it is reduced to a problem of potential
virtual-address leakage rather than physical-memory leakage.
Unmapping the physical pages therefore eliminates the prob-
lem. In addition, unmapped pages need not be examined for
pointers, as they are inaccessible, reducing marking costs. This
is implemented using a bit in the allocator’s per-page metadata.
On reallocation, if the allocator wishes to reuse space with
the unmapped bit set, it calls mmap with the address of the
page or region as its argument. Otherwise, mmap is called
with the address at the end of the current heap, installing new
metadata. This prevents the allocator from accidentally reusing
the unmapped space of pointed-to addresses for new objects
if its heap is exhausted. If the programmer uses mmap calls
elsewhere, then these can be wrapped to prevent reuse, though
as with previous work [7] we have not found the need to do this
in practice because munmapped space is typically not reused
in an mmap unless deliberately requested.
For large objects, this makes our allocation and deallocation
strategy similar to use-after-free-prevention techniques that
use a separate virtual page for every allocation [6], [7]. The
differences are in how we treat small allocations. First, we
store multiple small objects in the same virtual page to avoid
TLB pressure, and use marking procedures to reclaim the
memory. Second, virtual addresses are eventually reclaimed
by marking procedures. Third, aliasing of physical pages is
unnecessary because MarkUs only needs to map one physical
page to one virtual page at any point, rather than using multiple
mappings to have concurrently-live small objects allocated in
the same page but accessible by different virtual addresses.
G. Small-Object Block Sweeping
The Boehm-Demers-Weiser pool allocator ensures all objects
within a page-sized block are of the same size. Once freed,
(a) Quarantine list elements from entirely-unmarked blocks are found
and sent to a small-object list for further analysis, in an attempt to
free the entire page for use by differently-sized objects.
(b) The free lists of the appropriate sizes are checked, to find any
objects within blocks we are trying to entirely free, and placed on
the small-object list if from an unmarked block.
(c) Any block for which every object is on the small-object list is
entirely freed. Objects within partially-freed blocks with no marks
are instead placed on the relevant free lists of the pool allocator.
Fig. 4: An example of walking the quarantine, free and small-
object lists when using small-object block sweeping.
these small objects go to separate free lists per object size,
and by default are only reused for new objects of that size.
MarkUs deliberately trades off marking-procedure fre-
quency for memory overhead. This means that, even for a
small working set of memory objects, many pages can be
allocated between each marking procedure, which, by default,
can only be used for memory objects of the same size from
that point on. This can result in significant memory overhead,
because if the proportion of object sizes changes over time,
this allocation space effectively becomes unusable.
To fix this, we deallocate blocks that consist of entirely-
freed memory objects, allowing them to be reused more
generally. One way of finding this information out is by
looking at the marks within a block: if the block is entirely
unmarked, we can reallocate it by deleting every element from
the appropriate free list. However, in C and C++, where the
marks of a collector cannot necessarily be trusted, this results
in a safety violation, as we may free objects that the user is
still accessing. Instead, we use that information as a guide
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to trigger a more complicated analysis. If there are no marks
within the block of an object on the quarantine list, we do not
free that object immediately. Instead, we add such objects to
a small-object list. We then sweep the free list, moving any
objects that share a block with a quarantined object we think
is in an entirely free block back to the small-object list. We
then check to see if any blocks are entirely within this new
small-object list. If they are, we delete the entire block and
allow its reuse for differently-sized objects. If not, we add
them to their original free list, from which they may have just
been removed. An example is given in figure 4.
This means that, as well as freeing small objects in partially-
free blocks so that they can be reused, we also safely free
entire blocks so that they can be reused for data of other sizes,
preventing memory leaks even for programs with many distinct
memory-allocation phases throughout their execution.
H. Concurrency and Parallelism
The marking procedure is parallel; it can be run on multiple
threads at once by splitting up the current frontier of objects
to be searched for pointers. This has the effect of making the
marking procedure faster and more efficient on multicores, and
decreases single-core slowdown at the expense of spreading
CPU utilisation across many cores. If too high, this can impact
other applications running on the system. However, MarkUs
typically spends little time running marking procedures, and
parallel execution is typically more energy efficient.
MarkUs’s marking procedures are performed concurrently
with application execution, which continues while the stack
and heap are searched. Since data may be modified during the
marking procedure, to preserve correctness we use page-table
dirty bits [16], set when pages are modified while a marking
procedure is being concurrently performed, to track this new
data. These dirty pages are then checked once again at the end
of the marking procedure, to check for the presence of any new
accessible regions. The marking procedure need only stop-the-
world briefly at the start of the marking procedure, through
sending suspend signals to each thread, (to collect registers
as root sets to find pointers) and at the end (to preserve
correctness under concurrent modification). Since these require
little work, stop-times are unnoticeable, and thus MarkUs
works for applications with user interaction, such as browsers.
Walking the quarantine list is performed under the allo-
cator’s lock, and is thus single-threaded. While this could
be parallelised, its overhead is negligible compared with the
marking procedure, and thus optimisation is unwarranted.
I. Coverage Limitations and Hidden Pointers
Since low-level languages, like C and C++, allow pointer
hiding, for example by XORing them with other data, we
are not able to see all of them. That doesn’t stop our sys-
tem from being semantically safe, however, since we only
ever delete objects that the programmer freed themselves,
so we cannot introduce undefined behavior. However, it also
means that MarkUs could fail to detect complex use-after-
free vulnerabilities involving hidden pointers, as is a limitation
with any technique that involves identifying pointers. Still, a
garbage collector works for most parts of most C and C++
programs [21] The vast majority of pointers are not hidden,
as we examine in section V-I. Further, most hidden pointers
are already carefully implemented, and so are unlikely to
contain use-after-free errors. This means the defence is practi-
cal, and other techniques that rely on, for example, zeroing
old pointers [1], [4], [23], or tracking them [16], are also
vulnerable. MarkUs can further successfully protect programs
even in the presence of integer-casted or union pointer types
that the compiler cannot disambiguate, but MarkUs can treat
as potentially containing pointers.
An attacker can deliberately create pointers to objects just
through write access to integer arrays, as MarkUs cannot by
default distinguish between pointers and data. This prevents
deallocation of such space, causing larger memory utilisation.
This gives an attacker with full allocation abilities no more
power unless they are limited to a given area of sandbox space,
at which point they can have more system-level impact than
they could otherwise, potentially exhausting the application
of memory instead of just the sandbox. Still, there are two
alternative mechanisms that can be used to prevent this specific
case, if necessary for a given application. The first is that a
sandbox’s memory can be limited to prevent its quarantine,
as well as its allocated data, from exceeding a given size.
The second is that, in high-level languages, we can tag allo-
cation space as integer-only, to avoid its marking and prevent
any conservative pointer behaviour. The Boehm allocator we
use [16] already supports the latter, but as it is a very specific
use-case, and requires application targeting rather than being
entirely drop-in, we do not utilise this in our implementation.
The allocator’s headers (section III-E) are isolated from
data, and so cannot be targeted by use-after-free in quarantine.
However, our current implementation inherits small-object
links that are stored within old objects. An attacker can
potentially rewrite these links in two ways if they find a use-
after-free. First, they can add false elements to the list, though
unless these elements are hidden pointers they cannot be
deleted, and unless they can be written to by the attacker, the
marking procedure will not reach the end of its list, preventing
application progress and the presence of a useful attack. Sec-
ond, they can possibly remove elements or cause loops through
an existing double-free. While neither causes useful privilege
escalation, as they either prevent program progress or only
affect memory utilisation, a full implementation could isolate
metadata at negligible overhead. Fast allocators, including
jemalloc already utilise such isolation [10], and we only avoid
it for implementation complexity.
J. Summary
This section has presented the design of MarkUs, a use-after-
free-preventing memory allocator for low-level languages,
based on quarantining data that is manually freed by the
programmer and verifying it using a marking procedure of
the stack, heap, registers, and data segments. Through this,
MarkUs achieves both safety with respect to low-level pointer
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handling, and protection against use-after-free attacks. To
minimise the costs of the technique, we optimise this strategy
by directly limiting the number of marking procedures based
on the amount of data the programmer has tried to free,
eagerly unmapping virtual pages of large allocations so that
the physical pages can be reused immediately following the
programmer’s deallocation, and using the marking procedure’s
overestimation of entirely-free regions of memory as a guide to
perform more complex checks to reallocate regions to objects
of different sizes. The next section describes our experimental
system before we move on to demonstrate how MarkUs
performs on real workloads.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We evaluate MarkUs using a prototype built by extending the
Boehm-Demers-Weiser Garbage Collector [11], [16]. This is
implemented as a shared library that overrides malloc, free,
calloc, realloc, new, and delete, which can be utilised by
defining LD PRELOAD before execution of a dynamically-
linked application, meaning source code access is unnecessary.
By default, we use a growth bound (section III-D) of 4, to
represent a quarantine list of 33% of the size of the rest of
allocated memory.
We evaluate on an Intel system, featuring a quad-core
Haswell Core i5-4570, 16GB of DDR3 RAM, and running
Ubuntu 16.04. For profiling, we used PSRecord [26]. We
evaluate using SPEC CPU2006 [24] (using reference inputs)
and Olden [27] (default inputs), to demonstrate on benchmarks
with a wide range of memory behaviors and to directly
evaluate against other work in the literature. We show C
and C++ benchmarks from SPEC CPU2006 to give direct
comparison with prior work; Fortran benchmarks behave sim-
ilarly. In addition, we use Firefox with BBench [28] to show
applicability to modern, particularly vulnerable workloads.
SPEC CPU2006 and Olden ran with no modifications, as do
most applications in practice, as the allocator is functionally
compatible with glibc malloc. MarkUs has also been tested
on a variety of real-world applications such as OpenOffice,
Okular, Evince, Texstudio, Vim and Emacs, where no notice-
able impact on the application was observed. For Firefox, we
compiled with --disable-jemalloc to directly hook malloc
and free instead of the custom allocator Firefox normally
uses, to reduce implementation effort. We also compiled with
--enable-valgrind and --disable-sandbox because the
sandboxing of Firefox is unaware that MarkUs’ marking pro-
cedure accessing all memory is intended behavior. This does
not enable valgrind during execution, but prevents warnings
from Firefox’s monitoring mechanism [29]. In production
environments, applications using custom intra-process sand-
boxing would be altered to be aware of MarkUs, or separate
instances of MarkUs would be used for each sandbox. We
execute all workloads three times, unless the benchmark suite
already makes another higher choice for us, for example, in
BBench. Bars show the mean from each of these, with error
bars showing the maximum and minimum values observed.
For comparison, we evaluate against results taken from
Oscar [7], Dhurjati and Adve [6], Dangsan [4], CRCount [25]
and pSweeper [23], on the benchmarks they use. In the latter
case, we compare against the pSweeper-1s technique, as this
compares most closely to MarkUs in terms of additional CPU
costs: overheads for pSweeper-1s on other cores are limited to
approximately 30%, rather than the 100% overhead that occurs
from the consistent use of a single extra core when pSweeper
runs continuously. By comparison, while MarkUs is allowed
to use the resources of other CPUs, the additional utilisation
is typically negligible. In addition, MarkUs also compares
favorably in terms of memory and performance against the
higher-overhead techniques presented in the paper [23].
V. EVALUATION
We first look at the overheads of MarkUs in terms of memory
and performance, contrasting them with other state-of-the-art
use-after-free protections [4], [6], [7], [23]. We then take an in-
depth look at how we can trade off overheads within MarkUs,
and the improvements rendered by the optimisations described
in section III. In particular, MarkUs results in performance and
memory overheads of 10% and 16% respectively on SPEC
CPU2006 [24], which are both improvements on all other
techniques for use-after-free prevention in C and C++.
A. SPEC Overheads
Figure 5 shows the performance impact on the C and C++
benchmarks from SPEC CPU2006 [24], compared with the
reported results from other state-of-the-art techniques. We
see that MarkUs has the lowest average performance impact
of any technique: 10%, versus 40% for Oscar [7], 36% for
DangSan [4], 15% (along with the additional overhead of an
extra computation thread) for pSweeper [23], and 22% for
CRCount [25]. While Oscar shows overheads of up to 4.5×
for pointer-intensive workloads due to TLB pressure, Dangsan
experiences up to 7× due to its expensive logging of all pointer
references, and CRCount pays over 2× even on workloads
such as povray that aren’t allocation intensive but often create
pointers, since MarkUs only increases the malloc and free
costs, it never incurs over 2× overhead.
Memory overhead shows a similar pattern in figure 6, where
MarkUs incurs an average 16% overhead, compared with
60% for Oscar, 140% for Dangsan, 130% for pSweeper, and
17% for CRCount. Dangsan and pSweeper, in particular, can
face crippling penalties due to the requirement of logging
all pointer locations in the program, and Oscar likely suffers
in extreme cases due to the number of page-table entries
required. The metadata for MarkUs behaves predictably, never
exceeding 2×, partly because it is designed to limit the
additional resources used before a marking procedure cleans
up the extra resources. Indeed, the variance that exists in
MarkUs is primarily due to the allocation strategy inher-
ited from the Boehm-Demers-Weiser garbage collector [16],
which, compared with the standard GNU malloc, can increase
or reduce memory usage significantly, even ignoring the pres-
















































































































































































































Fig. 7: Number of marking procedures performed in each
SPEC CPU2006 workload.
Even though CRCount can free objects once all references to
them disappear, whereas MarkUs deliberately delays this to
reduce performance overheads, MarkUs is still slightly lower
memory overhead: this is because it requires less metadata,
since pointers do not need to be identified and allocations
do not need reference counts, and since large allocations in
MarkUs can be deallocated immediately in the physical space
even in the presence of dangling pointers.
Without MarkUs, execution times range from 120 seconds
(povray) to 463 seconds (sphinx3), with a geomean of 280
seconds. With MarkUs, this changes from 120 seconds to
477 seconds, with the same workloads at the extremes, and
a geomean of 309 seconds. The overhead from MarkUs is
primarily from its marking procedures, and figure 7 shows that
the number of these performed can differ by several orders of
magnitude between each application: the more frequent deallo-
cation is, and the less amenable to page-table unmapping, the
longer spent marking and thus the higher the overheads. Since
MarkUs’s marking procedure is multithreaded, and so can
utilize the resources of multiple cores, in figure 8(a) we present
the CPU utilisation overheads as distinct from slowdown.




















































































































































(b) Slowdown from running SPEC CPU2006 simultaneously with
a MarkUs-augmented Xalancbmk, our most marking-procedure-
intensive workload, relative to the same workloads running simul-
taneously with an unaugmented Xalancbmk.
Fig. 8: System-wide resource metrics for MarkUs.
away, the effect of this on overall system resources is slight, as
most workloads do not spend much time performing marking
procedures: the average is 2.4% extra CPU resources per unit
time, and worst case 17.9%. Even running the most allocation-
intensive workload, xalancbmk, simultaneously with other
workloads (figure 8(b)) , the overall effect on performance is
minimal relative to an unaugmented xalancbmk. All workloads
suffer minor slowdown, due to some competition for resources
on CPU time from the parallel marking procedure, and some
also suffer from the increase in DRAM usage, but this is


































Fig. 9: Slowdown for the pointer-intensive Olden [27] suite
for MarkUs, compared with results reported from Dhurjati
and Adve [6]. As MarkUs does not increase TLB pressure,


































































Fig. 10: Slowdown for SPECspeed 2017 with MarkUs, using
four threads on our four-core system.
B. Olden Overheads
Techniques that use a page-table entry per allocation to enforce
use-after-free safety, such as Oscar [7] and Dhurjati and
Adve [6], can incur even heavier costs for pointer-intensive
workloads, where TLB pressure causes performance to drop
dramatically. As we see in the evaluation on Olden [27]
(figure 9), this is not the case for MarkUs, which can efficiently
execute even under such complex scenarios. While Dhurjati
and Adve suffer up to 11× overhead, and Oscar would likely
suffer similar overheads through using a similar strategy,
though we cannot verify this as no source is available, MarkUs
is never slowed down by more than 1.4× (1.1× average).
C. SPEC 2017 OpenMP Overheads
Figure 10 shows that, since MarkUs is implemented as an
extension to a parallel, concurrent garbage collector and allo-
cator [16], it works equally-well for multithreaded workloads.
Using MarkUs with SPECspeed 2017 and OpenMP results in a
slowdown of only 13%. Workloads are slowed down in similar
areas to their SPEC 2006 counterparts: gcc is slowed down
by the allocator (though others such as lbm, xz, and nab are
sped up by it), and xalancbmk and omnetpp are slowed down
through marking procedures. Of the newer workloads, only wrf
and roms are slowed down significantly. The former suffers
from the marking procedure, the latter from metadata overhead
due to less reuse of virtual pages. Still, typical overheads are
very low, and in line with the single-threaded SPEC 2006.
D. BBench Overheads
Figure 11(a) shows that the overheads are similar for complex









































(a) Slowdown for BBench. Error bars show the range of load times
from each successive page load, and result from marking procedure
costs not being evenly shared across all pages, in addition to existing






















































(b) The execution time of twenty rounds of BBench, normalised to
overall average render time for each page. We see that there is no
pattern – MarkUs does not cause increasing slowdowns over time.
Fig. 11: Experiments for MarkUs on BBench [28] in Firefox.
performance overhead is just 15% across the webpages loaded
by BBench [28] in Firefox. Because BBench measures short
individual page loads across an entire process invocation, we
do see some variance as a result of marking procedures being
invoked at different times during multiple loads of the same
page. Still, this is relatively limited, with worst cases well
below 2×, and a more mature implementation would be able
to limit this further through more offloading to other threads,
and a more incremental collection strategy.
As BBench can be repeated multiple times within the same
Firefox process invocation, we can use it to see how MarkUs
copes with long execution times. We see in figure 11(b) that,
despite the large variance in page rendering times throughout
repetition of BBench, there is no overall trend over successive
iterations — the load of a page in the 20th iteration of BBench
is similar to that on the first iteration.
E. Memory-Performance Tradeoffs
Because we know how much data the application has freed
since the last marking procedure, as discussed in section III-D,
we can adjust the frequency of marking based on the size of
the quarantine list. This gives us a tradeoff between memory
utilisation and performance, which we explore in figure 12.
As should be expected, the larger the maximum size of the
quarantine list, the higher the increase in average memory
consumption. The exception to this is dealII, where most
allocation is performed on large objects that can be imme-
diately unmapped on a free, and so similar memory overhead
is observed regardless of frequency of marking.
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In terms of performance, dealII again shows a flat curve,
only increasing mildly under very small quarantine-list sizes,
where the frequency of marking procedures starts to impact
execution. As most allocations are to large objects that can
be immediately unmapped, the size of the quarantine list
only grows slowly, and so all intermediate sizes for the
quarantine list give identical performance, and CPU overhead
is relatively stable regardless of setting. Perlbench is slowed
down moderately by MarkUs under extreme settings, though
only to 1.5× maximum, and reaches negligible overheads with
larger quarantine-list sizes. Similarly, additional CPU overhead
from marking procedures, run in parallel by the Boehm-
Demers-Weiser collector, is insignificant except from when
collections are extremely frequent. Xalancbmk and omnetpp,
by contrast, represent a more distinct tradeoff, were we can
directly increase performance by allowing higher memory con-
sumption: smaller quarantine-list sizes result in significantly
lower performance coupled with significant burden on other
cores from the parallel marking procedure.
F. Overhead Impact of Optimisations
MarkUs includes several features intended to improve perfor-
mance over the basic combination of a quarantine list and
garbage-collection-style marking procedure, described in sec-
tion III. In figure 13 we show each optimisation’s importance
in terms of performance, memory, and CPU utilisation over-
head, and consider them here in turn for the four allocation-
intensive benchmarks from SPEC CPU2006 [24], as identified
by Dang et al. [7]. We see that, even if garbage collection
were safe in C and C++, the performance overhead would be
intolerable: the optimisations brought about by MarkUs are
necessary for practical use.
No Optimisation For the allocation-intensive benchmarks
from SPEC CPU2006 [24], the overheads of the basic collector
in terms of performance and CPU utilisation are too high
for the technique to be worthwhile. For example, xalancbmk
(figure 13(b)) sees a slowdown of over 30× along with over
twice the CPU utilisation. This is because the Boehm-Demers-
Weiser collector performs a marking procedure whenever it
runs out of memory, even when no allocations can be freed,
as it does not have the information available to do better.
More surprisingly, memory overheads can also be unfavor-
able, with perlbench (figure 13(a)) and dealII (figure 13(d))
suffering from 2.5× and 7.5× increases respectively, from
memory leaks for large allocations with dangling pointers, and
the average consumption being pushed up by spending large
amounts of time in allocation-intensive regions due to frequent
marks significantly reducing performance. By comparison, the
benchmarks featuring many small allocations, xalancbmk and
omnetpp, suffer very low memory overheads, from the high
frequency of collection and the low probability of conservative
pointer aliasing for small allocations.
Page Unmapping The situation is considerably improved
for the benchmarks that feature large memory allocations
(dealII and perlbench) with the immediate unmapping of
virtual pages following a free of a large allocation. This
prevents any significant memory leaks, as the large objects that
are probabilistically most likely to suffer from conservative
pointer aliasing, and from dangling pointers, have their physi-
cal memory cost eliminated. In addition, as the allocator is free
to reuse unmapped pages with a new virtual address before a
marking procedure, the overhead of marking is significantly
reduced. Still, for workloads with small allocations below the
size of a page, marking procedures are still frequent, and
performance is low, particularly for xalancbmk.
Mark Frequency Optimisation The over-zealous marking
for benchmarks such as xalancbmk and omnetpp is drasti-
cally reduced when we delay marking procedures until the
programmer has attempted to free sufficient data. This extra
knowledge, unavailable to a garbage collector, allows us to
reduce the overheads from over 30× to 1.7× for xalancbmk.
As we deliberately trade off memory consumption for
performance, we may expect average memory utilisation to go
up, and this is true for perlbench and omnetpp. In particular,
these workloads suffer from significant overhead not just
because of the deliberate tradeoff, but because delaying the
marking procedure results in many pages of objects of each
size being created in between marking procedures. These are
returned to individually-sized free lists and never to the main
pool, causing significant overhead. However, we also see the
opposite occurring, with dealII exhibiting a lower overhead
with mark frequency optimisation than without it. This is
because we can use the quarantine-list size to trigger, as well as
prevent the triggering of, a marking procedure. Therefore early
marking procedures, before the program runs out of allocated
memory, can reduce overheads.
Small-Object Block Sweeping All four allocation-
intensive benchmarks have their memory consumption im-
proved by returning all entirely-free blocks of allocated objects
to the general pool, as the overhead of generating many
blocks of objects between marking procedures becomes only
temporary, rather than for the entire execution of a program.
For some programs, the overheads are even lower than with-
out mark-culling, as even with frequent marking procedures,
triggered on every new memory allocation, we can still have
blocks of objects that are only used during some allocation
phases, and wasted for the rest of the program.
As small-object block sweeping increases the amount of
computation necessary at the end of a marking-procedure,
the impact on performance is usually less positive, with
xalancbmk in particular seeing a slowdown. Still, dealII sees a
performance improvement, because of the significant reduction
in memory consumption contributing to a reduction in marking
procedures and better locality of data.
G. Allocator Overheads
Not all of the overheads of our sample implementation of
MarkUs can be attributed to the marking procedure. Figure 14
shows for comparison the overheads resulting from using only










































































Quarantine List to Heap Ratio
(d) DealII
Fig. 12: Tradeoffs in memory-usage, performance and CPU utilisation for the four allocation-intensive benchmarks [7] from

































































































Fig. 13: Overhead observed by cumulatively adding optimisations to the basic quarantine-list and mark technique, compared
with no protection, for the four allocation-intensive benchmarks [7] from SPEC CPU2006 [24].
MarkUs’s protection or any garbage collection: manual frees
are freed immediately in this case.
We see that this allocator itself can be a poor choice in
certain circumstances: it is 5% slower than the default Linux
allocator, accounting for almost half of MarkUs’s overhead.
In particular GCC shows one of the highest overheads for our
technique, but is unaffected in performance by the MarkUs
security mechanisms themselves. Indeed, many of the choices
in this sample allocator are not fundamental to the function-
ing of MarkUs, and we should expect a dedicated allocator
designed to optimise these cases may perform significantly
better depending on the circumstance. On the flip side, the
Boehm-Demers-Weiser allocator can perform better than the
stock glibc allocator baseline. For example, with xalancbmk
MarkUs does introduce true overhead, because frequent mark-
ing procedures are necessary. Still, the only SPEC CPU2006
workloads we see significant overhead on for MarkUs itself
are omnetpp, perlbench, milc and xalancbmk; most others
are relatively unaffected despite the security provided. By
comparison, providing the same security guarantees using
the full garbage collector adds very large overheads even
on workloads such as astar, milc, sphinx and soplex, where
MarkUs has no observable overhead.
H. Deallocation Efficiency
While one concern with MarkUs’s approach is that dangling
pointers could prevent it from freeing quarantined data, fig-
ure 15 shows that this is unwarranted. This figure shows the
proportion of quarantined space that can be cleared across
all marking procedures (i.e., memory freed not allocations
freed). We see that for most workloads, with the full MarkUs



















































Allocator Only (No Safety) MarkUs Full GC
9.4 82 9.7 14.1 14.4 31.6
Fig. 14: Slowdown resulting from the use of the Boehm-Demers-Weiser [16] pool allocator alone without garbage collection
or temporal safety, as opposed to the standard GNU allocator, compared with the full MarkUs technique which makes use
of the allocator, and compared with the allocator’s default full garbage collector (augmented with a quarantine list to prevent






























































Full MarkUs No Page Unmapping
Fig. 15: Proportion of space in quarantine that can successfully
be freed, with and without page unmapping.
cause no issue. The only exception is xalancbmk, where a
typical marking procedure only empties 90% of the quarantine
memory at once. However, without page unmapping, which
allows us to free larger allocations even if dangling pointers
exist, we start to hit significant issues. Astar, dealII, gcc,
h264ref, perlbench and xalancbmk start to leave significantly
more space in quarantine. DealII is particularly affected, as
many of its large allocations have dangling pointers, and they
exist for long periods of time, meaning quarantined space is
repeatedly not freed. Still, that MarkUs is so effective when
page unmapping is enabled tells us that dangling pointers tend
to only cause issues with large allocations. This is because
pointers are more likely to exist by chance to large allocation
windows, and a single pointer, such as on the stack to an old
array, can cause significant damage. These are the allocations
that page unmapping targets well, and so the optimisations to
MarkUs work together to hide an otherwise significant cost.
I. Coverage
While MarkUs functions correctly in the presence of hidden
pointers, as it cannot deallocate anything the programmer has
not freed, it can only protect allocations that have visible
pointers from attack. To measure this we use the inverse of
MarkUs; we use our marking procedure to indicate regions of
allocated memory that have not been freed by the programmer,
but do not feature marked bits in the mark table. In figure 16,
we see that hidden pointers are likely to be a negligible threat
in practice. While every SPEC CPU2006 workload features
some pointers that are invisible to MarkUs, and thus a marking
procedure on its own would incorrectly free them (potentially






















































































Fig. 16: Maximum address space, and percentage of address
space across entire run, that MarkUs cannot find references to
but the programmer has not freed.
uncommon; no workload has more than 0.001% of its address
space, averaged across its entire run, as hidden pointers.
J. Summary
MarkUs has better overheads in performance and memory
than any other non-circumventable security mechanism for
use-after-free attacks in low-level languages, and never suf-
fers from large overheads (maximum 2×). The optimisations
brought about by using, but not trusting, the user-provided
freeing information, in the form of the quarantine list, take
the technique from being infeasible, to very low overhead,
making it suitable for use in production environments.
VI. RELATED WORK
Page Protection Several techniques exist that use the
virtual memory system to prevent use-after-free attacks, by
only ever using each virtual page once, and allocating one
object per page. Electric Fence [30] is an example of this
approach, as is Dhurjati and Adve [6], who reduce overheads
by reusing physical pages, and aliasing them to multiple virtual
pages. Dang et al. [7] present Oscar, which expands this
technique to remove the need for source code analysis. While
this approach can work well if allocations are larger than a
page already, it causes extreme TLB pressure under pointer-
intensive workloads [6], causing severe performance losses.
For large allocations, MarkUs essentially behaves similarly,
in that pages are unmapped on deallocation. The difference is
that MarkUs deals with small objects more efficiently, reduc-
ing TLB pressure, and eventually reallocates virtual address
space after a marking has verified manual frees, preventing
exhaustion of the space.
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Pointer Nullification Another approach is to zero all
pointers to data upon its deallocation. This prevents use-after-
free attacks by removing dangling pointers. DangNull [1]
and FreeSentry [5] are examples of this technique, and Dan-
gSan [4] optimises the approach and deals with the complex-
ity of multithreaded workloads. To achieve this, each stores
an expanding list of pointer locations with each allocation,
resulting in high performance loss and memory overhead in
benchmarks with lots of copies of pointers. MPChecker [31]
uses pointer-indirection to look up every memory access in a
table, nullifying the table entry on a free. As it pays overhead
on every memory access, the overheads are significantly higher
than observed with MarkUs.
PSweeper [23] is also a nullification-based technique. The
difference is that, instead of zeroing pointers immediately
upon freeing an object, pSweeper zeros them continuously
in the background, using another thread and core to do so.
This offloads some of the overhead, but still results in high
memory utilisation from storing a live pointer table to find
references, high CPU utilisation from the use of additional
resources, and instrumentation overhead. To uniquely identify
pointers, separate data and pointer stacks must be used, with
heap allocation for structs that partially contain pointers.
Automatic Memory Management Garbage collectors pre-
vent use-after-free attacks by causing deallocation to occur
only once the last pointer to an object is deleted [14]. However,
garbage collection can result in high overheads, and is not safe
for C and C++ applications, which can hide pointers [18], and
if manual freeing of objects is supported (as in the Boehm-
Demers-Weiser garbage collector [16]), then use-after-free
attacks can still occur. Examples of garbage collector usage in
C to explicitly prevent use-after-free attacks include Fail-Safe
C [32] and CCured [33], but both suffer from high overheads
and incompatibility. CRCount [25] is inspired by reference-
counting garbage collectors, in that it uses reference counts to
find when objects the user has freed should be deallocated, by
instrumenting pointer creation and destruction in the compiler
and using a shadow space to keep track of them.
Project Snowflake [15] tackles the inverse problem to
MarkUs. While MarkUs seeks to add temporal safety to a
low-level language where garbage collection is unsafe, Project
Snowflake seeks to add temporally-safe manual memory man-
agement to a high-level language where pointers can be
reliably determined, and garbage collection is the default
deallocation strategy, to improve performance.
Pointer Labeling Some systems attach unique labels to
pointers and their allocations to prevent reuse of dangling
pointers, such as CETS [34]. This relies on taint propagation
to deal with pointer arithmetic, where the modified pointer
keeps the same label, though this results in false positives [1],
and the checks on every pointer access cause high overheads.
Hardening Hardening techniques, such as DieHard [8],
DieHarder [9], and FreeGuard [10], provide probabilistic reuse
delays to reduce the chances of use-after-free attacks. While
these techniques are circumventable [1], and can result in
high memory overhead, they typically result in relatively-low
performance loss. Cling [35] is an allocator that delays general
reuse to reduce attack chances, while allowing immediate
reuse of memory by objects from the same allocation call
site, deemed to be of the same type, to prevent some classes
of use-after-free vulnerability.
Detection Systems designed to detect the usage of dan-
gling pointers under debug conditions, rather than prevent
their use by a motivated attacker, are available. These include
hardware tagged pointer techniques such as in the SPARC
M7 [36] and recent Arm systems [37], which use a limited
number of bits as an ID field to reduce the likelihood of a
new allocation using the same ID as an old one in the same
location. Unlike MarkUs, these give immediate poisoning of
all dangling pointers, allowing the detection of use-after-frees
at the point of use rather than the prevention of their use by an
attacker. However, tags must quickly be reused due to the small
number of ID bits, and so a motivated attacker can easily wrap
around to restore the vulnerability from a security perspective.
Still, MarkUs composes well with such techniques. Not only
does MarkUs provide the security that tagged memory lacks,
and tagged memory the debug that MarkUs does not aim to
provide, but tagged memory can also make MarkUs more
efficient, by allowing reuse of memory multiple times, based
on incrementing the ID tag of each successive allocation,
before address space must be quarantined to ensure old IDs
have been eliminated and can be reallocated.
Software techniques to detect dangling-pointer use exist at
higher overheads, such as AddressSanitizer [38]. This poisons
free regions, along with the bounds of allocations, for detection
of both spatial and temporal safety violations, but as the
technique does not detect accesses using dangling pointers to
reallocated memory, and suffers extremely high overheads, it
is intended for debug, rather than for in production security.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have introduced MarkUs, an allocator that prevents use-
after-free attacks for low-level languages such as C and C++.
Its ability to verify the manual deallocation attempts of the
programmer, using a marking procedure to find live objects,
along with the use of the programmer’s deallocations to
optimise the process and free virtual pages early for large
allocations, allows overheads in performance and memory that
are lower than any other non-circumventable technique in the
literature, along with particularly low worst-case overheads.
This results in a technique that is already low-enough-
overhead for use in production settings. Still, our implementa-
tion was designed around the existing Boehm-Demers-Weiser
marking procedure and allocator, and as such represents only
a primitive set of optimisations for performance. We should
expect an implementation designed from the ground up for
the checking of manual deallocations to exhibit even lower
overheads, resulting in a new era of programs resilient to this
increasingly critical attack vector.
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